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T h e s i s
The Duty of the Common Carrier
to
Gratuitous Passengers.
-- by--
Owen L. Potter.
Cornell
School
U n i v e r s i t y,
o f L a w.
1839.
The different rules of care that a carrier of
passengers owes to those passengers w'hom it carries
gratuitously, and its right to limit that care by an
express contract with the passenger is of compal-a-
tively recent origin and development.
The attention of the courts was first called o+
to 44e this questiog less than half a century ago.
2
During the interval that has since elapsed the ques-
tion has been litigated in all its different phases,
and numerous contradictory decisions rendered.
It would be useless to try to reconcile these
decisions, as they are in many cases arbitrary, and
ignore prior decisions that have been made in the
same jurisdiction.
In some states it has been held that a carrier
of passengers owes the same degree of care to free
passengers as he does to those that pay fare.
While in other states a different rule has been fol-
lowed, namely, that a carrier of gratuitous passen-
gers is only bound to use slight care. And again
there is a dispute as to what extent a carrier can
limit his liability by express contract.
The leading case in this Country on the subject,
and in the absence of contrn ct exempting the carrier
from liability, is the case of Philadelphia Reading
Railw.,ay Company vs. Derby, 14 Howard, 428. In this
case Derby, the plaintiff, was a stockholder in the
defendant company, and on the invitation of its
president was riding in , special car provided by
the company, a collision took place by the negli-
gence of the agents of te company in allowinm a
freight train to stand on the tv°ack when they had
orders to keep the track clear, and in ,Iiich the
plaintiff was injured, and he brought action for'
damage s.
The company solight to defend the suit on the
ground that the plaintiff .-as a gratuitous passen-
ger. The court held, that it was the duty of the
carrier to transport the passenger safely, and that
this duty did not arise from the compensation paid
for the service; that this duty is imposed by lai
even when the service is gratuitous, and that as
the plaintiff was lawfilly on defendant's car at
the time of the injury, the fact that he had paid
no fare did not affect his right to recover for the
injury. The court also said: "When carriers under-
take to convey persons by the powerful but danger-
ous agency of steam, public policy and safety re-
quire that they be held to the greatest possible
care and diligence, and whether the consideration
for such transportation be pecumiary or otherwise,
the personal safety of passengers should not be
left to the sport of chance or negligence of care-
less agents, any negligence in such cases may well
deserve the epithet Gross!"
The doctrine laid down in the Derby case was
reaffirmed in the case of Steamboit New World vs.
King, 16 Howa-rd 260. King was a passenger on
board a steamer on avoyage from Sacramento to SanT'ran-
cisco, and was injured by the exploding of a boiler
flue caused by the negligence of the agents of the
c omp any. It seems that -<ing had formerly been em-
ployed as a waiter on board this boat, and just be-
fore she sailed from Sacramento, he applied to the
master for a free passage to San Francisco which %7as
granted him and he came on board.
The company was held liable for the injury,
and the court said: "We desire to be understood to
reaffirm the doctrine of the Derby case, as rest-
ing not only on public policy, but on sound princi-
Thus we see that in the absence of
contract exe-qpti-n- the carrier from liability for
injuries to a gratuitous passenger that he is still
liable the same as though faro had been paid.
This is well settled both in England and in this
Country, although there are some contrary decis-
ions.
Railroad companies are incorpora.ted, in part,
at least, from considerations of public tolicy end
for public good, and as carriers of persons they
may be considered as acting in a public cai acity,
and being creatures of' the law they are held to a
strict degree of care for the safety of the lives
and limbs of those whom they carry.
pies of law.'
The liability
of a carrier of passengers is imposed by law, and
requires him to use the utmost care and foresight
for the snfety of his passengers, and holds him li-
able for the slightest neglect, and for like rea-
sons the same extreme care is required though the
passenger be carried gratuitously; having undertak-
en to carry a person, the obligation arises to car-
ry safely and properly, even in the case of gratu-
itous passengers.
The case of Gillen'rater vs. M & I. R:-. Co.,
5 Ind., 53, where Gillenwater was injured,while
riding on the cars of the defendant, through the
negligence of its agents. The company was held
liable notwithstanding the fact that he paid no
fare. Tt seems that he was employed by the rail-
road company to frame and build a bridge on their
road across a creek, and while so employed the corn-
pany directed him to proceed on their cars to
Greenwood, and assist in loading timbers for the
bridge; that :. hile thus on their cars as directed
the defendants so carelessly managed the same that
they were thrown off the track down a bank, by
means of which his right hand was so badly injured
as to disable him from pursuing his business. Tt
was held that it made no difference that Gillenwa-
ter was travelinf on the road, at the time paying
no fare, and that the company was liable to him as
a passenger and stranger. Applying the rule that
railroad carriers are responsible to passen-
ge s to the utmost care of very cautious persons,
it follows that they are liable in every case of
injury to a passenger, if he is la:fully on their
cars, whether he has paid fare or not. If a per-
son is a trespasser on the cars and is injured the
carrier is not liable to him, as there is no under.
taking on the part of the carrier towards such a
person, and he could not, on an-: grounds, hold the
carrier. There is a dut'. that the carrier owes
the passenger on his own account, and also oi the
account of his safety as a citizen of thie state.
The latter is a consideration of public polic
growing out of the interest which a state or gov-
eminent has in protecting the lives and limbs of
its sr biects. And so far as the consideration of
public policy is concerned, it cannot be overriden
by any stipulation of the parties to the contract
of )assenger carriage, since it is above all other
considerations from its nature; and no stipulation
of the parties should be allowed to modify or vary
it, whether the case is one of passenger for hire
or merely a gratuitous passenger, the interest of
the state is the same in both.
The more rigid the rule as to the duty and li-
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ability of the carrier, and the more strictly en-
forced, the greater will be the care exercised by
the carrier towards his passengers. It is true
that common carriers of passengers are not insi-ir-
er's of the safety of passengers, as they arc in
the case of goods which they carry; but principles
of law which forbid their being allowed to exempt
themselves from the consequence of their neyli-
gence in respect to goo4s applies : ith still great-
er force in the case of passengers. The Common
law had a great regard for human life, and for this
rerson it exacted a greater degree of carte in re-
spect to it than in mere relation to any other mat-
ter of Property. (Shearman and Redfield on 7egli-
gence).
In New York it has been held, by the Court of
Appeals, three judges dissenting, that a common
carrier can, in considc-attion of an abatement in
whole or in part of his legal fare, lawfully
contract 'vith a passenger that the latter will take
upon himself the risk of damage from negligence of
agents and servants, for wich t':e carrier would
otherwise be liable. In this case Bissell ;vas a
drover and made a contract with the defendants
which recited thet, in consideration thct defend-
ants would convey the stock at viat was termed re-
duced rates, the plaintiff to assiune the risks of
the journey, and all risks of injury to the stock.
The ticket also contained a notice that the owner
of stock receiving this ticket assumes all risks
for injuries, whether prom negligence of defend-
ants' servants or otherw'ise. (25 7". Y.,9 442).
Tt is well settled that, a carrier Yiy in this
stete, by special contraIct, exempt himself from all
liability, but that of the directors or managers
themselves, and it will be sustained by the courts.
The weight of authority in this country is
against such contracts. The courts of this state
for a long time resisted the attempts of comnon
carriers to limit their common law liability and,
at first, only allowed them to do so for the pur-
pose of obtaining a disclosure in the case of goods
that were subject to extra hazard and risk. But
now this is changed, and the carrier can limit his
liability as imposed by law to almost any extent
that can be conceived.
Whether it was wise on the part of the courts
i uphold!%g such contracts is a matter of dispute.
It can be said that a person who enters into such
a contract should be bound b- the terms it imnposes,
and should not, in case a loss occurs to him, or if
he is in'ured, bring action to recover ,P]at he has
expressly contracted away, but in all cases where a
contract is made between a drover and a carrier
they do not stand on equal footing and it may be
presumed that the carrier has made the contract all
in his favor, and for that reason it -iould seem but
just that he should still be liable for certain
acts and not be allo-aed under any circumstances to
escape them.
There has been an attempt to hold a carrier
of passengers liable for injuries to a free passen-
ger, on]y when such injuries arise from gross neg-
ligence, but it is now p-'etty well settl, O that it
makes no difference whether the injury be caused by
slight or gross negligence that the carrier is li-
able for both, and the only exception is whether
the person injured was lawfully? on the cars at the
time the injury occurred, and if the person injiired
was a trespasser the carrier is not liable.
3 Mont, 90, holds that a carrier of passengers is
bound to exercise only ordinary care toward tres-
passers.
The effect of a contract whereby a carrier
of passengers attempts to avoid his liability for
negligence, and this most frequently arises in cas-
es where persons are traveling on free passes, and
on which are printed conditions that the person
useing the 1jass assumes all risk, and that the
carrier be released from all negli'ence. Tn the
case of Wells vs. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 24 N. Y., it
was held that a person accepting a free ticket was
bound by its terms and that such a contract is val-
id. This was decided by a divided court and this
case has been widely commented on and criticized
and it is thought by many courts and writers on
this subject that the dissenting opinion by Suth-
erland, J. is founded on the better reasoning.
It is certainly in harmony with the iweight of au-
thority and also consistent witlh public polic.'.
Sutherland, J., who dissented holds a contract ex-
empting a carrier from all liability to be against
public policy, and therefore void. He enquires:
"And is it not plain that any contract which may
induce or lead, or tend to induce or lend to a re-
laxation.,of the care and attention required b.,, lay.,
as a social duty for the preservation of human life
interferes with this public policy, and should be
held void as against the laws declaring it." And
his views are based on the ground that rrilroad
companies are, in a certain sense, public offic-
ials, and the rule binding them to great care 1.as
not established only for the benefit of the party
injured, but also for the benefit of the entire
public, "and that a passenger cannot, by any con-
tract in advance of the injury, lay aside his in-
dividual benefit from the law or rrle of liabil-
itr."1 And this was followed in Perkins vs. the
sane company, aWd the further princille that the
negligence from which the carrier could exempt it-
self wzs that of i-,s agents or employees, but it
could not exempt itself from the negligence of its
directors or managers, as they may be considered
the corporation itself, and negligence on their
part would be a breach of duty which the company
owes to the public. And Smith, J., said: "Ser- .r';
vants or agents mean conductors, engineers, brake-
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men, bag,'agemen, switch tenders and so on."
Thus as far as the la, is concerned in this
state it is well settled; and a carrier can exempt
itself from all liability, except that 'risin, from
the culpable negligence of its directors or manag-
ers. And, notwithstanding that the United States
Supreme Court has established and firmly maintains
a different rule, the courts in this state stand
firmly by their former decisions, and in 71 N. Y.,
180, Maynard vs. Syracuse Railroad Company, it was
held that the ruile laid down by the United States
Supreme Court to the contrary did not modify or
relax the rule in this state, and that the common
carrier may make special contracts to the extent
of enabling it to exonerate itself frorn the effects
of even gross negligence.
We will now consider the rule as applied in
some other states as affecting a carrier's right to
limit his liability. In Penn. Ry. Co. vs. Hen-
derson, 51 Pa. St., 315, it was held by the Supreme
court that a contract for exenption from all lia-
bility for negligence was void, as being against
the policy of the law-
Tt appeared in this case that Hendei'son, on
the trip on which he was illed, shipped some live-
stock to Philadelphia and received a drover's pass,
being a ticket given to the person in charge of the
stock, thei-e being no charge for the ticket, and
the freight being the same whether any person went
with the stock or not. On this ticket was the
following endorsement: "The person accepting this
free ticket assumes all risk of accidents and ex-
pressly agrees that the compl any shall not be liable
under any circiustances, wetvhet1er of negligence by
its ag-nts or otherwise for any injury to the per-
son or for the property of the part\, using this
ticket. " Rut, notwithstanding this contract, the
company was held liable.
The courts of Pennsylvania have never been led
away from the Common law liability of the carrier,
and while they criticize the rule laid down and
followed in this state, they still maintain and
hold that all contracts that release the carrier
from all liability are void. Carriers in that
state are held to a strict account for the safety
of the lives of their passengers, and the rule is
rigidly enforced without any relaxation even in the
case of contract allowing them to throw off their
liability. And even supposing that a carrier can,
by special contract, exempt itself from other ex-
emptions than those allowed by law, still such con-
tracts ought not to be allowed to release them from
the consequences of gross negligence, as gross neg-
ligence on the part of a carrier of passengers
should be looked upon as a crime, at least he is
bound in emjloying agents to select only careful
and skillful men; and in view of the many accidents
that happen in these days of railroad travel, in-
stead of relaxing the rules of law relating to the
common carrier of passengers, they should be drawn
around them with a still stronger hand than they
have been in times past. As said by Davis, J., in
the case of Stinison vs. New York Central Railroad
Company, 32 IT. Y., 335, "The fruits of the rule El-
lowing carriers to release themselves from liabil-
ity are already being gathered in increasing acci-
dents through decreasing care and vigilance on the
part of the corporations, and they will be contin-
ued to be reaped untila just sense of public policy
shall lead to legislative restriction upon power
to make this kind of contracts."
Now take the case of contracts between a dro-
ver and a carrier where the carrier states that in
consideration of carrying t.- cattle at reduced
rates, and giving the drover a free ticket, that
he thereby assi)rnes all risks from whatever cause
arising. The statements usually made by a car-
rier in such cases are purely fictitious and he
does not really carry at reduced rates, he only
takes this way of evading his liability.
It is absolutely necessary in carrying stock
that the person ,ho has charge of them should be
carried by the company so he can take care of the
stock, and the price paid fo- the stock, or
freight on the stock, includes the cost of trans-
porting the drover, or the person accompaning the
stock, who is not, therefor!, a gratuitors passen-
ger, but a paying one, and t*!e word f'ree is, there-
fore, only true so far as that the conductor of the
particular train on which he ',ravels is not entit-
led to charge him separately for his passage.
This is the rule followedl in the United States
Suprewe Court, in the case of Railroad Company vs.
Lockwood, 17 Wallace, 357j. Lockwood, a drover,
was injured while traveling on a stock train from
Buffalo to Albany, and brought action to recover
d.--iges for the injury. He had cattle on the
train, and had been required, at Buffalo, to sign
an agreement to attend to the loading, transport-
ing and unloading of them, and to take all risk of
injury to them, and of personal injury to himself,
or to whomsoever went with the ca-tle; and he re-
ceived what is called a drover's pass, that is, a
pass certifying that he had shipped sufficient
stock to pass free to Albany, but declaring that
the acceptance of the pass was to be considered
a waiver of all claims for damages or injuries re-
ceived on the journey. The agreemnet stated its
consideration to be the carrying of the plaintiff's
cattle at less tlian regular rates charged, but it
was shown that these rates were aboit three times
the ordinary rates charged, and that no drover had
cattle carried on t'ose terms but that signed sim-
ilar agreements to that signed by Lockwood, and re-
ceived si'j4lar passes.
It -,as held by the court that Lockwood was a
passenger for hire, and that the company could not
exempt itself from its liability. The result
might have been different had the court found that
Lockwood wYis a free passenger, but as to this it
was not even hinted how they would have decided had
this been the case. But it was said that it vwas
against the plicy of the la,- to allo-r stii~ulations
which will relieve the company fror- the exercise of
that care and diligence that is i!nposed upon them
for the performance of their duty. ,.e have al-
ready seen that this is contrary to the rule in
this state, as here a drover is held to be a free
passenge, and that a carrier can release himself
from a11. liability to such drover. Mhile t;ie
courts of -,his state are not boind to follow the
decisions of the Federal Court, it would perhaps
be better if thiey would do so, and it seems that
they could consistently, with reas, ns of principle
and policy, do so.
In England it is now settled that a comnon car-
rier may, by s-pecial contract, exempt itself from
all liability, whether arisin, frota slight, ordi-
narn, or gross negligence. The case of !AcCowley
vs. Furners Ry. Co., 8 Queen's Bench, 57, where a
drover was carried under a pass, one of the condi-
tions of w;'ich was, that 'IcCawley was to travel at
his own risk. And it was held that !hi exempt-
ed the company from all liability for injuries to
him, wether caused by slight or gross negligence,
and also where a pe,-son takes his o -n risk, it
makes no difference as to the degree of negligence
whereby he was injured. The English cases are
decided on the ground that a drover is a free pas-
senger, and that the carrier can, in consideration
of friee transportation, limit his liability for in-
juries to such passenger. This is, Jiowever, con-
trary to the earlier decisions, and it was formerly
held that a condition that the owJner sho!,ld under-
take all risk of conveyance 'zas unreasonable, be-
cause it protecLed the company from the conse-
quences of injury, though caused b, their own mis-
conduct.
So we see that in England the law has grad-
ually changed till it has naiv -eached the same re-
sult that has been given such contracts in this
state, with the exception of gross negligence, and
it is doubtful if our courts will ve" alo.r the
riile to be th's appliod.
As a check on carriers limiting their liabil-
ity, Parliament, in 1854, passed an act called the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, declaring that rail.
way and canal companies should be liable for the
negligence of themselves or t!,eir servants, not-
withstanding any notice or conditions, unless the
court or judge trying the cause should adjudge the
conditions jilst and reasonable.
This statute practically brought the law
back to its original standing, and thus the law
stands at the present time in regard to contracts
between carrier and passenger, and the only limi-
tation is that the court shall, in all cases of
contract where the carrier seeks to avoid his li-
ability for injuries, say whether the contract is
just and reasonable.
We have in this country three different doc-
trines in regard to degree of care required to
be exercised by the carrier towards gratuito-1s pas-
That of the United States Supreme Court,
holding all contracts that exempt the carrier from
all liability void. The rule followed in Penn-
sylvania, allowing the carrier to limit his liabil-
ity to some extent but not for ,-ross negligence.
And the radical rule laid down and pushed along in
this state by the aid of the courts. For New York
certainly stands alone and has the honorl(if such
it may be called) of allowing greater latitude to
contracts exempting the carrier from all liabil-
ity for negligence than any othor state.
The law can only be brouarht back to its orig-
inal standing by legislative enactment; and ve
hope to see the duty of conmon carriers of passen-
sengers.
gers, whether hey be gratuitous or paying passen-
gers, rigidly enforced, and such laws enacted as
will tend to lessen the number of accidents that
are ca7'sed by negligence and indifference on the
part of railroad companies.
It is difficult to perceive , however, why
some courts hold that a free passenger may contract
that he shall make no claim for damages incurred by
the negligence of the servants of the carrier.
Public policy forbids such contracts, and it should
not be considered whether the service is gratui-
tous or not.
Men owe duties to their fellow men, and those
duties cannot be released by contract in any case,
whether the passenger has or has not paid fare.
Some courts, however, content themselves with
stoping at the point of gross negligence, and re-
fuse to allow a carrier to exempt himself from its
effects (Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. vs. Read, 37 Ill.,484).
Read while traveling in the cars of defendant com-
pany, received injuries to his person occasioned by
a collision of trains. At the time of the acci-
dent he was traveling under a free pass given him
by the company upon which wEre the usual printed
conditions contained on free passes exempting the
company from all liability for injuries.
It was held that this might exempt them for
negligence that had the character of recklessness,
but not from gross negligence.
Is not the whole business coi-mnunity affected
by holding contracts that relieve the carrier from
all liability valid. The business of transporta-
tion is mostly concentrated in a few pow:erful cor-
porations, and they control and make such contracts
as suit them, with such conditions upon travel as
they choose and the public are bound to accept.
Contracts of common carriers, like those of
persons occupying a fiduciary capacity, are given
a position in which they can take undue advantal-e
of the persons with whom they contract; and for
these reasons, all contracts that exempt the car-
rier from that duty which he sho ld exercise from
the nature of his calling, should be hold void as
an userpation of power that is conferred on him
by his charter.
Concludig, therefore, that there are certain
contracts between carrier and Passenger that will be
upheld as valid, that all contracts that stipulate
for exemption from negligence, whatever be its de-
gree, are repugnant to the law and also contrary
to public policy.
In regulating the public establishment of com-
mon carriers, the groat object of the law '&ss to
secure the utmost care and diligence in the per-
formance of their important duties that are neces-
sary to every advanced communit-y. And in looking
at the great advancement that has been made in
means of travel, and the danger to be encountered
in undertaking a jorrney from fear of accidents
caused in many cases from careless agents, one can-
not but think that the rigid rules of law that were
first applied to co.mon carriers has becomc a
thing of the past.

